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SEPARATE BUT EQUAL EDUCATION IN THE
CONTEXT OF GENDER
ISABELLE KATZ PINZLER*
[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of ‘sepa-
rate but equal’ has no place.  Separate educational facili-
ties are inherently unequal.1
Single-sex education affords pedagogical benefits to at least some
students, Virginia emphasizes, and that reality is uncontested
in this litigation.  Similarly, it is not disputed that diversity
among public educational institutions can serve the pub-
lic good.  But Virginia has not shown that VMI was estab-
lished, or has been maintained, with a view to diversifying,
by its categorical exclusion of women, educational oppor-
tunities within the Commonwealth.2
I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of single-sex education3 raises intense arguments
and surprisingly fervent emotions, especially given that single-sex
schools and classes are currently a relatively rare phenomenon in
* Visiting Professor, New York Law School.  J.D. Boston University, 1970; A.B.
Goucher College, 1967. Thanks to my research assistant, Christine Tramontano, New
York Law School, Class of 2006.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
2. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535 (1996) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted) [hereinafter, “VMI”]. The VMI case involved a challenge by the United States,
represented by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, to the mainte-
nance by the Commonwealth of Virginia of a public military academy open only to
males. The lower courts had upheld the policy of exclusion of all females on the
grounds that there are educational benefits to being educated in a single-sex environ-
ment and that the vast majority of women could not learn under the so-called “adversa-
tive” system, i.e., the extreme boot camp like methods used at VMI. While not
challenging the premise that single-sex education might have some benefits, the Su-
preme Court, in an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, held that it was a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause to offer such an opportunity to only one sex.
3. A word on the use of terms: I will use the value neutral and most common
term “single-sex” education rather than “sex segregated” education, which, of course,
does characterize some systems around the world, and which usually implies criticism,
especially in the context of the Brown case of racial segregation.  Some prefer “single
785
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this country and almost non-existent in public education.  Debates
on the subject have already cost the sacrifice of many forests of pa-
per and gigabytes of hard drive, often generating more heat than
light.  It has given rise to scores of law review articles4 and two ma-
jor symposia5 just since United States v. Virginia6 (“VMI”) was decided
in 1996.  Many of these materials were written or presented during
the years that the VMI case and its sibling case challenging the
male-only admissions policy of The Citadel7 were pending.  Despite
the renewed interest in the controversy, occasioned by the passage
of the No Child Left Behind Act8 (“NCLBA”) and new Title IX reg-
gender” education, but it is much less commonly used and in this circumstance means
more or less the same thing.
4. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full Citizenship”:
A Case Study of Sex-Segregated Public Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755 (2002); Amy H.
Nemko, Single Sex Public Education After VMI:  The Case for Women’s Schools, 21 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 19 (1998); Nancy Levit, Separating Equals:  Educational Research and the
Long-Term Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451 (1999); Valorie K.
Vojdik, Girls’ Schools After VMI:  Do They Make the Grade?, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 69
(1997); William Henry Hurd, Gone With the Wind? VMI’s Loss and the Future of Single-Sex
Public Education, 4 DUKE J. GENDER & POL’Y 27 (1997); Rosemary Salomone, Rich Kids,
Poor Kids, and the Single-Sex Education Debate, 34 AKRON L. REV. 209 (2000); David B.
Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2002); Denise C. Morgan, Anti-
Subordination Analysis After United States v. Virginia:  Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12
Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381 (1999); Christopher H. Pyle, Women’s
Colleges:  Is Segregation By Sex Still Justifiable After United States v. Virginia?, 77 B.U. L. REV.
209 (1997); and Jenny L. Mathews, Comment, Admission Denied:  An Examination of a
Single-Sex Public School Initiative in North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REV. 2032 (2004).
5. Indeed, one of the aforementioned symposia occurred here at New York Law
School in 1997 and was published in the New York Law School Journal of Human
Rights, A Symposium on Finding a Path to Gender Equality: Legal and Policy Issues Raised by
All-Female Public Education, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. i (1997).
6. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
7. Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552 (1994), aff’d as modified by 51 F.3d 440 (4th
Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Jones, 136 F.3d 342 (1998) [hereinafter, collectively “The Citadel
Cases”]. This case involved a challenge, initially by a private plaintiff, later joined by the
United States, to the male only military college maintained by the State of South Caro-
lina. I was, for a time, one of the attorneys for Shannon Faulkner in that case.
8. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq.).  The NCLBA is an initiative of the George W. Bush
presidential administration which is intended to raise the standards of the public
schools and to make them more accountable for student performance. The main focus
of the law is to make federal educational funds available to the states if they in turn
require testing of periodic measures of students’ performance on standardized tests.
The law has been very controversial for a number of reasons, not the least of which is
the failure of Congress and the Administration to fully fund the expenditures required
under the statute.
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ulations9 proposed by President George W. Bush’s Department of
Education (see infra), at this stage I believe there is very little new to
be said on the subject.  To my knowledge, there has been no major
litigation since VMI, and little new social science research since
then.  I, therefore, do not intend to rehash this legal debate except
in the most summary form.
I do intend, however, to propose a controlled experiment that
might shed some light on the ongoing debate of whether and
under what circumstances single-sex education might, as a matter
of public policy, be a good idea.  The answer to that question may,
in turn, inform the discussion concerning whether it is constitution-
ally and legally permissible.  If, however, it turns out that single-sex
education does not provide added educational value, the legal de-
bate becomes moot.
For most of my career, I have been an advocate for the rights
of women and girls.  The current crisis in education in this country,
however, is not principally about sex discrimination.  In making my
proposal, I am gravely concerned both about quality and equality in
public education.  We know some of the determinants that are im-
portant to quality education, such as small classes and qualified
teachers.  But, we do not know whether, or under what circum-
stances, single-sex education, by itself, is one of those variables.
The lack of hard data does not prevent individuals or institu-
tions from having very strong opinions and policy positions on the
subject.  There are a number of considerations contributing to the
urgency of the debate:  1) the crisis in public education in general;
2) the perception of continuing sex discrimination in the schools;
3) the fierce belief of many supporters of single-sex education, in-
cluding many feminists, in the advantages of educating boys and
girls (or at least girls) separately; and 4) the equally fierce, though I
believe much less prevalent, belief that single-sex education is never
acceptable.  These factors have led to a renewed effort to experi-
9. 34 C.F.R. 106 et seq. (2004) (current regulations generally prohibit sex segre-
gated education in federally assisted education programs but allow exceptions for sepa-
ration of students by sex within (1) physical education classes that result from the
application of objective standards of physical ability, (2) physical education classes in-
volving contact sports, (3) portions of classes in elementary and secondary schools deal-
ing exclusively with human sexuality, and (4) choruses based on vocal range or quality,
which may result in a single-sex or predominantly single-sex grouping).
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ment with single-sex education as one solution to the many ills of
the public schools.  Among its better known provisions for pupil
testing and other requirements on local schools, the NCLBA specif-
ically calls for greater experimentation with single-sex education,10
and the Bush Administration has recently proposed amending reg-
ulations under Title IX11 to allow for greater flexibility in anti-sex
discrimination requirements in order to allow for greater experi-
mentation with single-sex education.12  The real problem facing the
nation, however, is that public schools are failing so many children,
regardless of their sex.  A preoccupation with single-sex education
is arguably a diversion from dealing with schools as a whole.  It is
thus somewhat ironic that a renewed interest in single-sex educa-
tion coincides with the 50th anniversary of the Brown v. Board of
Education13 decision, which declared unconstitutional what might
be called “single race.”
Brown had a major, but indirect, effect on the movement for
women’s equality.  It was, of course, the seminal case of the civil
rights movement and that movement was, in turn, the inspiration
and the template for many other subsequent struggles for equal
rights, including the women’s rights movement.14  But Brown itself,
the case that theoretically15 put an end to racially segregated public
10. Amendment by former Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, § 5131(a)(23), codified
in 20 U.S.C. § 7215(a)(23).
11. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276 (proposed Mar. 9, 2004) (to
be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106), discussed in detail infra at pp. 800-02.
12. 69 Fed. Reg. at 11,277.  Many groups and individuals have criticized the pro-
posed regulations.  For a comprehensive criticism, see National Women’s Law Center,
at http://www.nwlc.org/display.cfm?section=education#(Single-Sex%20Education)
(last visited Jan. 18, 2005).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. See, e.g., Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals Toler-
ate Religious and Cultural Practices That Discriminate Against Women, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 154, 164 (2003) (noting that a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), agreed with appellants’ contention that sex discrimina-
tion paralleled race discrimination); Serena Mayeri, Note, “A Common Fare of Discrimina-
tion”: Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045, 1056
(2001); National Women’s History Project, Living the Legacy: The Women’s Rights Move-
ment 1848-1998, available at http://www.legacy98.org (last visited June 13, 2004).
15. Research from the Harvard Civil Rights Project shows that the enrollment of
black students in predominantly, and 90-100% minority, schools steadily decreased
from 1969 until 1986, when the percentage of black students in predominantly minority
schools went back on the rise.  The percentage of Latino students in predominantly
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schools, has had surprisingly little direct impact on either gender-
based discrimination in or exclusions from public education pro-
grams, or on single-sex education.  Indeed, Brown is never cited by
the Supreme Court in discussion of these issues, nor has “separate
but equal” ever been held constitutionally impermissible in the con-
text of sex.16
There are at least two important analytical distinctions between
race discrimination and sex discrimination, which may explain in
part why Brown is not usually part of the Court’s discussion of sin-
gle-sex education.17  First, in the context of public education,
women (at least white women) and people of color started in two
very different places.  It is true, taking the long view, that separate
education for white women and girls, like separate education for
newly freed black slaves and other racial minorities in this country,
was a first step away from what had previously been total exclusion
from educational opportunities.  In that sense, both single-sex and
racially segregated education were conceived in the sin of discrimi-
nation.18  However, for the most part, public education in this
minority schools did not parallel the decline of the black percentage from 1968 to 1986;
the percentage of Latino students in predominantly minority schools has been escalat-
ing since 1968. See Gary Orfield & John T. Yun, Resegregation in American Schools,
(Harvard University 1999), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/re-
search/deseg/reseg_schools99.php; The National Center for Education Statistics re-
ports that in 2003, “about 40 percent of Black and Hispanic students attended schools
in which 90 percent or more of the students were minorities.”  Elementary/Secondary
Education, Concentration of Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity and Poverty, The Condition of Educa-
tion 2004, at 40 (June 14, 2004), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2004/
section1/indicator05.asp.
16. See discussion infra pp. 789-92.
17. As someone who has spent most of my career litigating for women’s rights, this
is not an easy admission, for advocates have often sought to analogize sex discrimina-
tion to race discrimination in discussions on a range of issues, including constitutional
analysis, employment, public accommodations, the military, and education.  The com-
parison, when it works, has often been the most powerful argument in the rhetorical
arsenal.
18. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Is There a Slippery Slope From Single-Sex Education to Single-
Race Education?, J. OF BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. (2002), (“The primary methods of unjust
subordination of blacks in American history have been degradation and separation; for
women they have been paternalism and role differentiation, emphasizing women’s spe-
cial responsibilities as caretakers.  So whites-only policies always meant something differ-
ent from men-only policies.  Separation of blacks signaled their social inferiority and
their enforced separation from white society.  By contrast, separation of women actually
reinforced their connection to men and their roles as men’s wives, mothers, and daugh-
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country, in contrast to public education in many other nations, has
largely been co-educational.19  Although there are still sixty or so
private women’s colleges in the United States, and depending on
the definition of “single-sex” only two or three public women’s col-
leges, there are only three private all male colleges, and since VMI,
no public all male colleges.20  Many private single-sex institutions,
both at the secondary school and college level, began to disappear
in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of (more or less) voluntarily go-
ing “co-ed” in response to the demands of the market.21  The expe-
rience of co-education was not equal for boys and girls in the past,22
ters.  While gender discrimination presumed that women would play a subordinate role
within families headed by men, race discrimination was premised on keeping black and
white families separate so that they would not be social equals.”).
19. See generally DAVID TYACK & ELISABETH HANSOT, LEARNING TOGETHER: A HIS-
TORY OF COEDUCATION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1990).  For a summary of this
book and other histories on women and education in the United States, see Denise C.
Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis After the United States v. Virginia: Evaluating the Con-
stitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381 (1999); Denise C.
Morgan, Finding a Constitutionally Permissible Path To Sex Equality: The Young Women’s
Leadership School of East Harlem, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 95 (1997).
20. See Neal Thompson, Boyz II Men At Hampden-Sydney College, Single-Sex Education
Has Never Fallen Out of Fashion, WASH. POST, June 22, 2003, at W20 (reporting that
Hampden-Sydney, Morehouse College and Wabash College are the only three all-male
colleges left in the country); note that all three are private colleges.
21. See, e.g., Mark Mueller, Students Rally Against Lassell Plans to Go Coed, BOSTON
HERALD, Oct. 15, 1997, at 6, (“Since 1960 . . . the number of U.S. women’s colleges has
dropped from 300 to 77.  Moreover . . . recent surveys show that 96 percent of high
school seniors have no interest in single-sex colleges.”); Melissa Hendricks, Great Coed-
Spectations, JOHNS HOPKINS MAGAZINE, Nov. 1999, available at http://www.jhu.edu/
~jhumag/1199web/coed.html (“Administrators had begun to fear that Hopkins, which
in 1969 was $530,000 in debt and suffering a decline in applications, would continue
losing applicants to other previously all-male schools that had gone coed.  They argued
that admitting women would improve Hopkins’s recruitment efforts and social life, and
bolster the humanities.  In 1969, the academic council, and finally the trustees, voted to
admit women as undergraduates.”); Irene Harwarth et al., Women’s Colleges in the United
States: History, Issues, and Challenges, available at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OERI/
PLLI/webreprt.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
22. AMERICAN ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOW SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE
GIRLS (1992) (concluding that boys receive more attention and encouragement from
teachers than do girls, the textbooks used in schools ignore or marginalize historical
contributions and experiences of women and girls, sexual harassment of girls by boys is
increasing, girls are less likely than boys to take advanced math courses, the gender gap
in science is increasing); see also, MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS:
HOW AMERICA’S SCHOOLS CHEAT GIRLS (1994).
But note that the study by the American Association of University Women
(“AAUW”) is often misinterpreted as supporting a new movement for single-sex educa-
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and may still present problems of equality today.23
The second relevant analytical difference between race dis-
crimination and sex discrimination in the context of education is,
of course, that women do not constitute an “insular minority” in the
tion.  See, e.g., Kristen J. Cerven, Single Sex Education: Promoting Equality or a Constitutional
Divide?, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 700 (2002) (“[s]ingle-sex education has taken a new
place at the forefront of educational and psychological research and scholarly discus-
sion in the past decade.  This phenomenon is largely attributable to a 1992 report by
the [AAUW] entitled, How Schools Shortchange Girls . . .” (Footnote omitted)).  AAUW
has posted Policy Position Papers on its website that clarify its position.  AAUW states
that it does not oppose the idea of single-sex education, so long as it is appropriate,
necessary, and done in a manner consistent with constitutional requirements and ex-
isting anti-discrimination laws, but also states that “[s]ingle-sex education is not the
solution” and urges policy makers to “look for solutions that benefit coeducational pub-
lic schools.” See also AAUW’s 1998 report, Separated by Sex: A Critical Look at Single-Sex
Education for Girls (Susan Morse ed., 1998), available at http://www.aauw.org/member_
center/publications/SeparatedbySex/SeparatedBySex.pdf (finding “no evidence that
single-sex education is better than coeducation.  AAUW makes clear that it “strongly sup-
ports Title IX and opposes any effort that would weaken its effectiveness in ensuring
equal educational opportunity for all students.”). See also AAUW, Single-Sex Education,
available at http://www.aauw.org/takeaction/policyissues/single_sex.cfm; and AAUW
Positions on Education, available at http://www.aauw.org/takeaction/policyissues/posi-
tions_education.cfm.
It should also be noted that the Sadker book has been much criticized. See, e.g.,
Amy H. Nemko, Single Sex Education After VMI: The Case For Women’s Schools, 21 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 19 n.233 (1998) (“The Sadkers’ research has frequently been based on
observations and anecdotal evidence, rather than controlled variable studies.”).
23. Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term Conse-
quences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451 (1999). But see Gene Koretz, School
Is Now Kinder to Girls, BUS. WK., Mar. 2, 1998, at 32.  According to the survey results:
“[M]ore girls than boys feel they get positive feedback from teachers for answering
correctly, and more girls (76% vs. 67%) report getting helpful comments when they
answer incorrectly.  Similarly, about a third fewer girls than boys (19% vs. 31%) com-
plain that teachers don’t listen to them.  For their part, teachers see girls as more confi-
dent, more focused on education, and more likely to graduate from college.  This
survey showed that minority girls have the highest confidence rating, but minority boys
have the lowest expectations for themselves.  Boys may suffer in some settings and
under some conditions.”  (footnotes omitted).  There is, of course, also renewed inter-
est in single-sex education for boys, especially African Americans and other minorities.
See, e.g., Verna L. Williams, Reform or Retrenchment? Single-Sex Education and the Construc-
tion of Race and Gender, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 15 (2004) (“[s]ex segregation has been
deemed particularly necessary for African American males because they are an ‘endan-
gered species . . . target[ed] by this system for destruction and extermination.’  In this
connection, arguments for single-sex education focus on the myriad issues confronting
Black male students, such as high rates of incarceration and homicide.” (footnotes
omitted)).
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sense often referred to by the courts.24  That females are a slight
majority of the population, though, has not mitigated the sexism
and discrimination experienced by women in many aspects of life.
The fact that women in this country are fully integrated into
whatever ethnic or racial groups to which they belong, and are thus
not isolated or separated from the surrounding culture and society
in the same sense as racial minorities in this society, may, however,
be pertinent to the question of single-sex education.25  With these
caveats, I will proceed to a quick review of the relevant legal history.
II. A SNAPSHOT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION
Even the most ardent opponent of single-sex education (and
there are some, but very few) must agree that VMI, as important as
it is in sex discrimination jurisprudence, is no Brown. VMI prohibits
a male-only admissions policy in a state-run educational institution
where there is no separate and even comparable institution for
women.26  The case says nothing about the fate of single-sex educa-
tion in the non-existent situation (now or ever) of two separate but
equal public educational institutions, one for males and one for fe-
males.  Contrary to the predictions of doomsayers among the amici
supporting VMI,27 the case has not ended, or even threatened, sin-
24. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), which
noted that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.”  But, women are not usually considered an insular minority.
See VMI, 518 U.S. at 575 (noting that “it is hard to consider women a ‘discrete and
insular minorit[y]’ unable to employ the ‘political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon,’ when they constitute a majority of the electorate.  And the suggestion that they
are incapable of exerting that political power smacks of the same paternalism that the
Court so roundly condemns.”).
25. There is also the factor of average physiological differences as well as other
asserted (average) differences between the sexes.  A full discussion of this contentious
issue is beyond the scope of this essay, though it has played a large part in the litigation
of the leading cases concerning single-sex education. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 550, and
Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440, 443 (4th Cir. 1995).  It is also highly relevant to the
issues concerning women in athletics, particularly under Title IX, but that issue will not
be discussed here.
26. See generally VMI, 518 U.S. 515.
27. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Wells College et al. at 5, United States v. Vir-
ginia, 516 U.S. 910 (1995) (No. 94-1941); Brief of Amici Curiae the State of South
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gle-sex education in this country; it has merely ended male-only ad-
missions at the two remaining male-only public colleges.  Further,
contrary to the accusations of some, ending single-sex education per
se was never a goal of the movement for women’s legal equality.
When Ruth Bader Ginsburg,28 then a Professor at Columbia
Law School and the founding director of the Women’s Rights Pro-
ject of the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), designed the
litigation that ultimately led to the establishment of heightened
scrutiny for sex-based discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause, the goal was to achieve the same level of constitutional scru-
tiny accorded to race-based classifications that was first announced
in Korematsu v. United States,29 i.e., strict scrutiny.  While Brown was
pivotal in inspiring the civil rights movement and consequently the
women’s movement, the case itself never mentioned the term
“strict scrutiny” as a basis for holding that “separate but equal” was
inherently unequal, although that may have been assumed.30
The first successful challenge to the constitutionality of legally
mandated sex discrimination was, of course, Reed v. Reed.31  Decided
in 1971, Reed was the first case in which the Supreme Court invali-
dated a state mandated sex-based classification.  The Court relied
on the rational basis test as it always had in sex discrimination cases,
but nonetheless invalidated the statute in question.  From then to
Craig v. Boren,32 the Supreme Court developed heightened or mid-
dle-tier scrutiny to analyze sex-based discrimination under the
Carolina and the Citadel et al., at 11 n.10, United States v. Virginia, 516 U.S. 910 (1995)
(No. 94-1941); Brief of Amicus Curiae Mary Baldwin College at 20, United States v.
Virginia, 516 U.S. 910 (1995) (No. 94-1941); Brief of Amici Curiae Dr. Kenneth E. Clark
et al., at 12-13, United States v. Virginia, 516 U.S. 910 (1995) (No. 94-1941).
28. See, e.g., Melanie K. Morris, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Equality: A Reassess-
ment of Her Contribution, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2002); Toni J. Ellington et al.,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Discrimination, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 699 (1998);
Carey Olney, Better Bitch Than Mouse:  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Feminism, and VMI, 9 BUFF.
WOMEN’S L.J. 97 (2001).
29. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
30. 347 U.S. at 483. Brown’s companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954), did refer to strict scrutiny in holding that the public schools of the District of
Columbia would also have to be desegregated.  Bolling, like Korematsu, concerned the
conduct of the federal government rather than a state government.  In any event, by the
1970s when then Professor Ginsburg was working on sex discrimination litigation, the
standard clearly applied equally to both levels of government.
31. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
32. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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Equal Protection Clause.  Although sex discrimination has never
been accorded the strict scrutiny sought by Ginsburg and others, in
a range of cases coming to the Supreme Court between Reed in
1971, through Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan33 in 1982,
and VMI in 1996, the Court did develop what is sometimes referred
to as “skeptical scrutiny.”34  I personally prefer the term “exceed-
ingly heightened scrutiny” because it suggests less deference than
the somewhat wishy-washy “heightened scrutiny.” Hogan and VMI
were the only cases involving single-sex education to actually be de-
cided by the Court, and interestingly, each was written by one of the
two current women Supreme Court Justices (Hogan by Justice
O’Connor and VMI by now Justice Ginsburg).  Each required that
legally imposed sex discrimination must be closely and substantially
related to an important government purpose (i.e., heightened scru-
tiny), but added to the earlier formulation the requirement that
sex-based distinctions can only be supported by an “exceedingly
persuasive justification.”35 Ironically, although both Hogan and
VMI were about gender-based exclusion in state supported educa-
tion, there was no discussion in either of whether separate but
equal is inherently unequal in the context of single-sex education,
because in neither instance was there an even (arguably) equal in-
stitution available for the opposite sex.36
The bottom line is that VMI did not hold that “separate but
equal” is unconstitutional in the context of gender for the simple
reason that the question was not before the court.  The Virginia
Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL), established at Mary
Baldwin College, a private women’s college, by the VMI Alumni As-
sociation during the litigation in an attempt to prevent the enroll-
ment of women at VMI, was not even arguably “equal” to VMI.
Indeed, its defenders did not claim it was.  Rather, they argued only
33. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
34. VMI, 518 U.S. at 531 (holding that “[t]oday’s skeptical scrutiny of official ac-
tion denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history”).
35. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724; VMI, 518 U.S. at 524.
36. VMI, 518 U.S. at 533 n.7, quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720 n.1 (“Mississippi main-
tains no other single-sex public university or college.  Thus, we are not faced with the
question of whether States can provide ‘separate but equal’ undergraduate institutions
for males and females.”).
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that it was “comparable,” which the Supreme court held was com-
pletely insufficient.37
Thus, VMI and Hogan are more comparable to Sweatt v.
Painter38 than to Brown. Sweatt, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents
for Higher Educ.,39 and their predecessors40 represented a litigation
strategy that emphasized inequality in graduate and professional
education available to blacks.  The alternative law school proposed
for blacks was measurably inferior to the University of Texas School
of Law, from which they were barred, just as VWIL could in no way
be said to be equal to VMI.41 Brown not only focused on elementary
and secondary schools, but also jumped immediately to the argu-
ment that separate is inherently unequal, without relying on a show-
ing that the separate schools were in fact unequal in measurable
indices such as resources, textbooks, libraries, and physical plants.42
The sex exclusion cases followed a similar path, though there
have been substantially fewer such cases in the context of educa-
tion.  For example, the first time female plaintiffs challenged the
elite boys-only Central High School in Philadelphia, arguing, but
not proving, that the all-girls alternative was unequal, they did not
succeed.43  Several years later, a second challenge was brought
under the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment, and there the
plaintiffs made the factual showing that the two schools were not
equal and that Central High School was superior.44  Thus, the argu-
37. The Supreme Court found vast differences between VMI and VWIL in re-
sources, curriculum and course offerings, military and physical education, SAT scores of
entering freshmen, prestige and reputation, alumni networks, etc. See VMI, 518 U.S. at
548-53.
38. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
39. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
40. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Bd. of
Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948).
41. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 553-54 for a discussion of the comparison to Sweatt, 339
U.S. 619.
42. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976); JACK GREENBERG,
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: WITNESS TO A LANDMARK DECISION (2004).
43. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880 (1976), aff’d by an equally
divided court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
44. Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 682 (1983).  The Court’s dis-
cussion of the material differences in the schools was unnecessary to the holding.  The
Court’s ruling was based on the finding that the single-sex boys school lacked an “im-
portant government objective” Id. at 711.
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ment that separation by sex is inherently unequal, as it is by race,
was simply not an issue.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION
The question, therefore, remains whether and under what cir-
cumstances “separate but equal” public single-sex education would
be constitutionally permissible.  Supporters of single-sex education
for both sexes make a number of arguments, each of which can be
expressed in many different variations.  For purposes of this discus-
sion, I will mention only two:  the elimination of the distraction of
the other sex, especially during adolescence,45 and the difference
in learning styles between males and females.
Individuals who support the first argument contend that the
presence of the other sex will cause distractions and lead to sexual
tension, showing off, or girls dumbing themselves down.46  How-
ever, many people who have experienced single-sex education (in-
cluding Professor Edward Purcell at the Faculty Presentation Day
Panel on Brown v. Board of Education) can testify that the absence of
the other sex does not necessarily lessen the distraction they may
cause.  Out of sight, in this instance, is not out of mind.  The argu-
ment, of course, also renders sexual minorities (i.e., lesbian, gay,
and transgender students) invisible.  It does not consider the dis-
traction that they may experience in a single-sex atmosphere.
The second argument is the much discussed, allegedly differ-
ent, “learning styles” of males and females.47  It is inarguable that
individuals have different learning styles,48 and axiomatic that in
45. See, e.g., Jane Gross, Dividing the Sexes, for the Tough Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
2004, at B1; Patricia B. Campbell & Ellen Wahl, Article: Of Two Minds: Single-Sex Educa-
tion, Coeducation, and the Search for Gender Equity in K-12 Public Schooling, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 289 (1997).
46. Of course, single-sex education does not necessarily eliminate this often ob-
served phenomenon. See, e.g., Daphne Merkin, The Machines Men Still Want?, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 15 (describing her 14 year old daughter and
her close friend who attend Brearley, “a Manhattan girls school that prides itself on its
high academic standards and is renowned for producing independent-minded young
women” and notes that, “what really gnaws at their adolescent souls is not whether they
will take over the White House one day but whether they’ll lose the boy if they take over
the White House.”).
47. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434 (W.D. Va. 1991).
48. Patricia B. Campbell & Jo Sanders, Challenging the System: Assumptions and Data
Behind the Push for Single-Sex Schooling, in GENDER IN POLICY AND PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES
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education one size does not fit all.49  But it is a mistake to genera-
lize learning styles on the basis of sex.  According to this essentialist
theory, males are more competitive and females more cooperative,
and thus, each sex benefits from a different educational environ-
ment.  Counsel for VMI and the District Court50 relied heavily on
such arguments, i.e., that the important differences in learning
styles were sex-based, supposedly based on the work of prominent
social scientists such as Carol Gilligan,51 whom they cited at great
length, but never called as witnesses.  Those arguments have been
thoroughly refuted by the social scientists themselves.52  However,
even if such sex-based average differences could be shown as to a
large number of individuals, there is never an attempt to ascertain
exactly which boys and which girls actually, as opposed to theoreti-
cally, have each type of learning style.  As is often the case in the
discussion of single-sex education, whether for one or both sexes,
the problems of sex-based stereotypes and essentialism are a con-
stant threat, and choices are too often made based on ideology
rather than individual needs.
Another important subset of the arguments for single-sex edu-
cation is that some young men — particularly, it is said, young men
ON SINGLE SEX AND COEDUCATIONAL SCHOOLING 31, 36 (Amanda Datnow & Lea Hub-
bard eds., 2002) (“Researchers have known for many years that the differences among
boys and among girls are far greater than any differences between an ’average’ girl and
an ‘average’ boy . . . There are many boys who learn better in the cooperative relational
style commonly associated with girls and many girls who learn better in the competitive
individualistic style often associated with boys.”) (references omitted). See also David W.
Champagne, General Article: Improving Your Teaching: How Do Students Learn? 83 LAW
LIBR. J. 85 (1991).
49. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 542 (commenting, “[e]ducation, to be sure, is not a ‘one
size fits all’ business”).
50. United States v. Virginia., 766 F. Supp. at 1434.
51. Gilligan, formerly a Professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education
and currently a Professor at New York University, is best known for her book, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE:  PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (Harvard Uni-
versity Press 1982), in which she asserts that women have differing moral and psycho-
logical tendencies than men and that they have different learning styles.  Her theories
were lifted out of context and used by VMI’s attorneys to argue in favor of single-sex
education and for the proposition that women could not benefit from VMI’s “adversa-
tive” educational system.
52. Brief of Amici Curiae American Association of University Professors et al. at
10-11, United States v. Virginia, 516 U.S. 910 (1995) (No. 94-1941); see also Joan E.
Bertin, Legal and Policy Issues Raised By All-Female Public Education, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 175 (1997).
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of color — have been somehow disadvantaged by being in co-ed
settings.53  This must be distinguished, of course, from two more
generalized points:  first, that minority children of both sexes, espe-
cially those suffering other economic obstacles, are often disadvan-
taged in public schools, and second, that minority males may suffer
from a whole range of disadvantages having nothing to do with the
presence or absence of women or girls in educational and other
institutions.  A legal challenge to the male-only academy in Detroit
resulted in the school admitting girls.54  In either event, any focus
53. See generally supra note 23. See also Tenisha Mercer, Academy’s Tough Approach
Pays Off; Benjamin E. Mays’ Leaders Set High Expectations for Students, THE DETROIT NEWS,
Sept. 11, 2002, at 4Z (Rev. James Perkins, creator of the Benjamin E. Mays Male Acad-
emy, stating, “Our boys are in the direst demographic in the country . . . I felt a need to
become involved in the crisis of African-American males.”).  The crisis Mays refers to
involves premature death, violence, drugs, crime, poverty and prison; Elaine Ray, All-
Male Black Schools Put On Hold In Detroit; Girls Will Be Admitted After Court Challenge; Educa-
tion, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 1, 1991, at A16 (discussing the disproportionate number
of black male drop-outs, disproportionate involvement in the criminal justice system,
the disproportionate number of street homicides of young black men, and the dramatic
decline in the number of black men attending college.); William Raspberry Column,
Don’t Slam the Door On All-Boy Schools, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 30, 1991, at 3E
(“Black boys in Detroit – and in cities across the country – are falling victim to academic
failure, joblessness, crime and death.”); Isabel Wilkerson, Detroit’s Boys-Only Schools Fac-
ing Bias Lawsuit, THE N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at A1 (“Desperate over the wasted lives
of its young black men, Detroit is about to open the nation’s first public schools for
inner-city boys, unless a court challenge blocks them.”); Janny Scott, Boys Only:  Separate
But Equal?; Does Placing Black Youths in Their Own Classes Help Them Do Better?  Some Public
School Educators Think So and Are Running Maverick Programs That Others Call Illegal or a
Civil Rights Retreat, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1994, at A1, (Spencer Holland, an educational
psychologist at Morgan State University in Baltimore is a “prime advocate of boys only
classes. . . . Holland believes that African American boys who grow up in households
headed by women develop attitudes toward girls and women that inhibit learning.”);
Thomas Carrol, Throwing Wide the Education Doors, THE N.Y. SUN, Mar. 24, 2004, at 8 (“In
Albany, the Brighter Choice Charter School for Boys . . . opened in September 2002 to
serve a predominantly low-income, African-American student body. . . . Parents of in-
ner-city boys see all-boys schools as a way to create an environment that focuses on
rebuilding a positive male culture.”).
54. Garrett v. Bd. of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).  The school had
never explicitly barred white students.  Since it was located in inner city Detroit, which
is almost entirely black, it was unnecessary to do so. See Lisa Holewa, School Focused On
Black Culture Evokes Protests By White Neighbors, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, at A4 (“Ninety
percent of 170,000 students enrolled in Detroit public schools [in 1991] were black.”);
Laura Berman, Integrated Schools Concept Fades In Reality of Modern Day, THE DETROIT
NEWS, May 11, 2004, at 1C (“Today, 90 percent of the children in Detroit public schools
are African-Americans.”).
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on issues of educating “at risk” youth cannot responsibly ignore the
needs of boys.
There are, nonetheless, some who support single-sex educa-
tion, but only or primarily for women, from a feminist or anti-subor-
dination perspective.  They posit the reverse of the logic of Brown,
i.e., that sex integrated or co-education is inherently, or at the very
least sometimes, unequal.55  My greatest concern with this rationale
is that it assumes that discrimination or something like it, even if
unconscious, is inextricably embedded in the co-ed setting.  The
evidence shows otherwise.56  I remain uncomfortable with any argu-
ment that either relies on, or can be interpreted as relying on, the
notion that women and girls cannot compete and thrive in a co-ed
setting.  This discomfort, of course, co-exists with a recognition that
many outstanding women’s colleges and prep schools, founded at a
time when women and girls were excluded from the educational
bastions of male dominance, made lemonade when served the lem-
ons of exclusion and discrimination.
One of the problems with allowing single-sex education for
girls only is the reverse of the “Catch-22” faced by defenders of sin-
gle-sex education for men at VMI and The Citadel — if single-sex
education is good for (at least some) women, then isn’t it also good
for (at least some) men?  Also, how can one posit separate but
equal if the separate institution is unequal in one key way —
namely, it is not single-sex?57  If a single-sex setting is itself a factor
in increased educational quality, then a co-ed setting can never be
fully equal to a single-sex setting, even if all other factors are equal.
Others posit that single-sex classes and/or schools might be
permissible for girls as a form of affirmative action, or as having the
55. See Erin A. McGrath, The Young Women’s Leadership School: A Viable Alternative to
Traditional Coeducational Schools, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 455 (1998); Amanda Eliza-
beth Koman, Urban, Single-Sex, Public Secondary Schools:  Advancing Full Development of the
Talent and Capacities of America’s Young Women, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507 (1998);
Heather Johnston Nicholson & Mary F. Maschino, Strong, Smart, and Bold Girls:  The Girls
Incorporated Approach to Education, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 561 (2001); Jennifer Gerarda
Brown, “To Give Them Countenance”:  The Case for a Women’s Law School, 22 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1999).
56. Campbell & Sanders, supra note 48, at 31.
57. For further discussion, see infra Section V.
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“benign compensatory” intent58 permitted by Kahn v. Shevin.59  This
approach raises many questions beyond the scope of this essay.  I
raise here only the problem that the single-sex education as affirma-
tive action argument ignores the requirement in Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke60 — that in order to meet the demand of
narrow tailoring, an affirmative action program cannot include an
absolute bar of the non-beneficiary group, which in this case is
boys.61
Finally, and perhaps most important, is the view that single-sex
education should be available in a public school setting as it is in
private schools, as a choice based simply on the preference of par-
ents and/or students, whether or not there is much, if any, social
science to support that preference.  This is the ultimate idea behind
the NCLBA and the proposed amendments to the Title IX regula-
tions.  When it comes down to it, the best that supporters of al-
lowing increased experimentation with single-sex education can say
about the research on the subject is that it has “suggested that in
certain circumstances, single-sex education provides educational ben-
efits to some students.”62  They go on to acknowledge, as they must,
that there is “presently a debate among researchers and educators
58. See, e.g., Verna L. Williams, Reform or Retrenchment?  Single-Sex Education and the
Construction of Race and Gender, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 15, 30 (2004); Denise C. Morgan,
Finding a Constitutionally Permissible Path To Sex Equality:  The Young Women’s Leadership
School of East Harlem, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 95 (1997); Sara Mandelbaum, Constitu-
tional, Statutory, and Policy Issues Raised by All-Female Public Education, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 81, 89 (1997); National Women’s Law Center, Administration’s Plan for Single-
Sex Classrooms Would Turn Back the Clock on Girls’ Educational Opportunities, (Mar. 3,
2004), at http://www.nwlc.org/details.cfm?id=1797&section=newsroom.
59. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1974) (compare discussion of benign
compensatory intent in Kahn with Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317-320 (1977)).
Note that Kahn does not use the term “benign compensatory.”  The reasoning in Kahn
was later labeled as “benign compensatory purpose” in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
60. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that petitioner’s special admissions program,
which considered race in admissions decisions, was unnecessary to the achievement of
the goal of a diverse student body).
61. See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003) (holding that because
the law school engaged in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant, it
ensured that all factors that could contribute to diversity were meaningfully considered
alongside race); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (holding that “the University’s
use of race in its . . . freshman admissions policy [was] not narrowly tailored to achieve
respondents’ asserted compelling interest in diversity.” Id. at 275).
62. 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276 (emphasis added).
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regarding the effectiveness of single-sex education.”63  Existing so-
cial science studies, including those cited in the proposed regula-
tions, are inconclusive at best.
Over the years, there have been dozens of studies on the effec-
tiveness of single-sex education, all flawed in some way,64 often be-
cause the paucity of existing models of single-sex education in the
public sector makes study of its effectiveness extremely difficult,
and compounds the confusion of single-sex education with quality
education.  The fact that single-sex schools exist primarily in private
and parochial school settings makes comparisons to public educa-
tion, especially in the urban environment, of questionable value.
One relevant study was done of the California pilot program that
experimented with single-sex schooling in the public sector.65  Cali-
fornia passed legislation in 1997 to fund a three year study of single-
sex schooling.  Six school districts serving substantial populations of
students who were low-income and/or members of racial and eth-
nic minorities received a $500,000 state grant to establish single-sex
academies, often within the walls of co-ed school buildings.66  The
study made a number of major findings, many of which illustrate
the potential problems with the single-sex model.  These include a
finding that although educators ensured that equal resources were
provided for boys and girls, they were less concerned about hidden
or overt gender biases that affected both sexes.  Traditional stereo-
types were often reinforced.  For example, girls were applauded for
being feminine and concerned about their appearance, while boys
were told they should be strong and take care of their wives.67  Also
disturbing was the finding that in at least two districts the imple-
mentation of single-sex academies “resulted in negative implica-
63. 69 Fed. Reg. at 11,277 n.3.
64. Campbell & Sanders, supra note 48, at 31.
65. Amanda Datnow et al., Is Single Gender Schooling Viable in the Public Sector?  Les-
sons from California’s Pilot Program, ONT. INST. FOR STUDIES IN EDUC., May 20, 2001, avail-
able at http://www.oise.utoronto.ca/depts/tps/adatnow/final.pdf. (last visited Nov. 18,
2004).
66. “But the single sex experiment at Marina Middle School and others around
the state ended after only one year when the state decided to pull the funding.  The
49ers Academy survived because of private donations.” Same-Sex Public Schools?, ABC7
NEWS.COM, at http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/news/051502_assign7_girl_boy_education.
html (last modified May 15, 2002).
67. See Datnow, supra note 65, at 6-7.
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tions for the students remaining in co-education[.]  [They] were
left either with an imbalance in the number of boys or girls, a less
motivated group of students who had not opted for the academies,
and/or less experienced teachers.”68  It is also noteworthy that this
study found that the real motivation for administrators implement-
ing the single-sex program was the opportunity to get extra funding
for what they saw as the more pressing problems of at-risk students,
and not as an end in itself.69  For most parents, the “academies were
seen as an opportunity for their children to benefit from special
resources and to reduce distractions from the opposite sex.”70
Thus, it can be argued that this study, as well as the many others
that are at best inconclusive about the impact of the separation of
the sexes in public education, far from supporting further uncon-
trolled experimentation, provides a cautionary tale for such willy-
nilly separation of the sexes.
IV. EXPERIMENTS: “SINGLE-SEX EQUIVALENTS”
The proposed new Title IX regulations would allow experi-
mentation with single-sex programs,71 although, without insuring
against sex-based bias and without sufficient controls.72  Specifi-
cally, they would allow for single-sex opportunities for one sex as
long as a comparable or “substantially” equal opportunity is availa-
ble for the excluded sex in a co-ed setting.  One particularly telling
example given in the preliminary discussion of the proposal is of an
all boys AP Calculus class coupled with a “substantially equal” co-ed
class.73  This rather curious example raises two series of fundamen-
tal questions.
First, what could possibly be the justification for an all boys AP
Calculus class?  I cannot think of any, at least any that are not based
upon the usual assumptions and stereotypes about the alleged rela-
tive academic strengths and weaknesses of boys and girls.  Defend-
ers of single-sex education for males usually claim that boys and
68. Id. at 8.
69. Id. at 5.
70. Id. at 6.
71. See 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276 (proposed regulations).
72. See National Women’s Law Center, supra note 12 (criticisms of proposed
regulations).
73. 69 Fed. Reg. at 11,279.
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young men can benefit from a single-sex experience in subjects
such as poetry, rather than math or science.  They argue that dis-
cussions about poetry involve expressing feeling and emotions (the
not-so-subtle suggestion being that these are “girl things”), and so
boys and young men are more likely to be willing to talk about such
things in the absence of girls.
Second, what justification might be given for all girls classes
with a co-ed substantial equivalent for boys?  Is it that girls may ex-
perience difficulty competing in co-ed math and science classes?
Even if there is some other justification, some stigma will inevitably
attach to the separate girls’ class based on the belief that girls can-
not successfully compete with boys.  Other questions involve: Which
girls get the single-sex experience and why?  Will the result be that
many fewer girls are available for the co-ed classes, thus causing a
gender imbalance, as occurred in the California program?  What
sort of problems might result?
The real problem with the co-ed “substantially equal” opportu-
nity is the inescapable fact that the co-ed setting must inevitably
lack the sine qua non that single-sex education proponents hold to
be so vital — the absence of the other sex.  This is the “Catch-22” of
single-sex education for its own sake.  If the opportunity for single-
sex education is an important choice among different educational
models, an approach that has significant educational benefits for at
least some students, and if the evidence does not show that only the
members of one sex can ever so benefit, then providing a single-sex
opportunity only to boys or only to girls, with only a co-ed opportu-
nity to the other sex, can never be “substantially equal.”
This was the conundrum faced by the advocates for the contin-
ued exclusion of women from VMI and The Citadel, who argued
that single-sex education was a good thing, one that ought to be
available among a diversity of educational choices.  The attorneys
for VMI first argued that the Cadet Corps at the Virginia Polytech-
nic Institute (“VPI”), which was co-ed, was an equal alternative for
women.74  But as the Fourth Circuit pointed out, VPI was not single-
sex and therefore did not afford women a single-sex opportunity.75
74. Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia et al. in Opposition at 12, VMI, 518
U.S. 515 (1996) (No. 94-1941).
75. See United States v. Virginia., 976 F.2d 890, 897 (4th Cir. 1992).
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Rather than admit women or make the school private, the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, and more particularly the VMI alumni, then
had to create the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership, a sin-
gle-sex but unequivocally unequal alternative to VMI.  Any proposal
to replicate such an approach, i.e., one single-sex opportunity “bal-
anced” with a co-ed opportunity, must run into the same “Catch-22”
constitutional shoals.
V. WHAT’S TO BE DONE? A PROPOSAL
The usual practice in discussing the controversies surrounding
single-sex education is to state one’s personal biases and opinion at
the beginning of a talk or written piece on the subject.  Many peo-
ple have assumed that they know my views based on the fact that I
have been involved in litigation challenging sex-based exclusions in
public education,76 and have held prominent positions at the
ACLU, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department during
the Clinton Administration,77 and the NOW Legal Defense and Ed-
ucation Fund,78 all of which have brought challenges against partic-
ular single-sex institutions.  On the other hand, I myself am a
76. I was at the ACLU when Hogan was brought by the ACLU of Mississippi and
advised on and assisted with the Supreme Court brief.  I was directly involved in the
Citadel litigation while there and indirectly involved in VMI, both at the ACLU and at
the Department of Justice.
77. The Clinton Justice Department sometimes was accused of being opposed to
single-sex education, though it took no such position in the litigation. Cf. Anita K.
Blair, The Equal Protection Clause and Single-Sex Public Education:  United States v. Virginia
and Virginia Military Institute, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 999, 1002 (1996) (“The Justice
Department has supported its arguments with a few colorful or offhand statements
painstakingly extracted from the record.  These isolated remarks mischaracterize the
weight and authority of the testimony by numerous highly qualified experts at two sepa-
rate trials.  The Justice Department invariably condemns as a ‘stereotype’ any fact that
interferes with the Justice Department’s preconceived idea about the ‘correct’ outcome
of this case.”).
78. NOW Legal Defense (now renamed Legal Momentum) litigated Garrett before
I was there.
VMI was briefed and argued before the Supreme Court during the first Clinton
Administration, and ironically, then First Lady, but now Senator, Hillary Clinton is on
record as being very much in favor of single-sex education. See, e.g., 147 Cong. Rec.
S5907-08 (daily ed. June 7, 2001) (statement of Sen. Clinton) (“I believe public school
choice should be expanded and as broadly as possible.  Certainly, there should not be
any obstacle to providing single-sex choice within the public school system . . . We have
to look at the achievements of a school such as the one in New York City that I men-
tioned, the Young Women’s Leadership Academy, or other schools that are springing
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-2\NLR214.txt unknown Seq: 21 14-MAR-05 19:17
2004] EDUCATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GENDER 805
product of single-sex education,79 and once urged my then 11 year-
old daughter to at least consider one of several excellent all-girls
private schools for junior high and high school.  As it happens, she
refused to even entertain that option, observing that in her view,
single-sex education does not prepare one for “real life.”  In fact, I
am not so much opposed to single-sex education, much less unal-
terably opposed, as skeptical.  I am wary, based on the voluminous
reading I have done on its educational benefits and on a fear that
the belief in its efficacy is both the result of, and leads to, stereo-
typed thinking about “essential” differences between the sexes.  I
also fear that over the long haul the single-sex opportunities pro-
vided for women and girls will prove to be unequal.  But I do not
have a definite opinion, and therefore cannot answer the question,
of whether I favor single-sex education or not.
However, knowing how fiercely many people whom I respect
continue to defend and push for single-sex education, and because
the research to date is both inconclusive and subject to attack on
the grounds of failure to control for variables other than the ab-
sence of the other sex, I propose the following:  I challenge the
Department of Education — in contrast to the uncontrolled so-
called experimentation with single-sex education, as proposed in
the new Title IX regulations — to fund a “gold standard” experi-
ment on the relative advantages of single-sex education.  The De-
partment should create a test of the value of single-sex education
within a system that enhances both the quality and equality of all
education.
Because this experiment would be expensive and take time, I
doubt that my challenge will be taken up anytime in the near fu-
ture.  Nevertheless, my proposed experiment with single-sex educa-
tion would proceed roughly as follows:  first, choose school
populations that are relatively homogeneous in terms of income
and educational backgrounds of the parents.  Second, solicit partic-
ipation in a “magnet” program that promises (and delivers) an ex-
cellent educational opportunity (including excellent physical
up around the country.  We know this has energized students and parents.  We could
use more schools such as this.”).
79. I graduated from Goucher College in 1967, then a women’s college.  It later
became co-ed.
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plants, well qualified teachers, up-to-date equipment and books,
small classes, and required parental involvement) regardless of
school or classroom placement.  Make it clear that parents must
agree to have their children placed in one of four settings without
knowing in advance where their child may be placed:80  an all boys
school, an all girls school, a co-ed school, or a co-ed school that may
have some single-sex classes in some subjects (aside from physical
education and health education, which are traditionally often sin-
gle-sex).  Fully fund and stir for several years (long enough to mea-
sure the long-term outcomes).  Measure the outcomes.  Constantly
monitor all the programs for any creeping inequalities and stereo-
typing and report same.
I have no idea what, if anything, such an experiment would
reveal about the efficacy of single-sex education.  Given all these
resources, however, I would be surprised if most of these children
did not thrive.  Would parents rather have their children in a medi-
ocre single-sex school or an excellent co-ed school?  What does the
obvious answer to that question tell us about single-sex education as
a goal in and of itself?  Of course, some might say that they want
both excellence and a single-sex option.  The reality, however, is
that in most instances neither is available.  What we often have in-
stead is a very small number of students (usually girls) in a well-
funded single-sex environment.81  The vast majority of inner-city
public school students (both girls and boys) are “left behind” in
under-funded and under-resourced general public schools; besides
being no solution, this is profoundly unfair.
80. This is to prevent parental bias concerning single-sex education or co-educa-
tion from unduly influencing the perceived outcomes.
81. One example is the Young Women’s Leadership School (YWLS) in Harlem.
See, Kristen J. Cerven, Single-Sex Education:  Promoting Equality or an Unconstitutional Di-
vide?, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 718 (2002) (noting that at the YWLS every classroom has
a computer and every student has an email acccount); Jason M. Bernheimer, Single-Sex
Public Education:  Separate But Equal Is Not Equal at the Young Women’s Leadership School In
New York City, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 339, 349 (2003) (commenting that while New
York City’s public schools are plagued with overcrowded classrooms and cafeterias, and
violence, lack desks for over 90,000 students, and hold classes in locker rooms, students
at YWLS enjoy clean, safe classrooms with about 15 students per class, and a curriculum
that emphasizes math and science); Liz Willen, Girls’ School Gets Lesson In Controversy/
Some Call It Discrimination, NEWSDAY, Nov. 6, 1996, at A68 (reporting that YWLS has its
own library, its labs are stocked with new equipment, and fresh flowers adorn the dining
hall).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Two things are clear about public education today.  First, excel-
lence in education is being prevented by several factors, including:
lack of resources, large class size, not enough qualified teachers,
creaming off the top students, and little parental involvement.  Sec-
ond, there is public demand to “do something! anything!” about
our failing public schools.  Well-funded and carefully monitored
single-sex opportunities may be valuable for the small number of
children who receive them.  The same may be said of some charter
schools and some voucher programs.  Regardless of the efficacy or
even the constitutionality of such proposals, policy makers must not
be diverted from the larger picture.
To illustrate this point, Patricia Campbell and Jo Sanders82 tell
the parable of the babies in the river.
Once upon a time there were three people walking next
to the Hudson River.  Looking over, they saw the river was
full of babies.  One of the three jumped into the river and
started throwing babies out to the shore; the second
jumped into the river and started teaching the babies to
swim while the third started running upstream.  “What
are you doing?” cried the two in the water to the third.
“There are babies drowning in the river!”  “I know,” said
the third, “I’m going to find out who’s throwing babies
into the river and make them stop.”
To save all the babies we need to focus on both the equality and
quality in education for all children, all girls and all boys.  Realisti-
cally, that means co-education for all but a very few.  So we had
better make sure that that education is as excellent and as bias-free
as possible.
82. Campbell & Sanders, supra note 48, at 41-42.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-2\NLR214.txt unknown Seq: 24 14-MAR-05 19:17
